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NOTE
POLICE AND REGULATORY POWER vs. PECUNIARY
INTERESTS: THE BANKRUPT HAZARDOUS WASTE
SITE OWNER FACES THE MUSIC. UNITED STATES v.
NICOLET, INC., 857 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1988)

INTRODUCTION

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)' created a sweeping liability scheme in
order to reclaim the environment and protect the public health, safety,
and welfare. CERCLA provides that all current owners and operators 2 of
a facility,3 all past owners and operators who were associated with a
facility at the time of a disposal of hazardous waste, and all generators,
transporters, and persons who arranged for disposal of hazardous waste
are potentially liable for a wide range of response4 costs.5 A critical issue
in the development of CERCLA liability is whether a potentially liable

party can, by filing for voluntary bankruptcy, escape a suit by the government for response costs. The United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) estimates that over the next 50 years, up to 30 percent of

the firms owning or operating waste disposal facilities will petition for
bankruptcy. 6 Many of these firms are likely to seek shelter from the
enforcement of environmental laws by application of the automatic stay
provision of the Bankruptcy Code.7
. 1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA),
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§4611-4672 (1988), and
at 42 U.S.C. §6911 (a), §§9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). See also, Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (Supp. V 1987)).
2. Bankruptcy does not exclude a party from being defined as an "owner or operator." See, 42
U.S.C. §9601(20)(A):
(20)(A) The term "owner or operator" means...
(iii) in the case of any facility, title or control of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy
...
or similar means to a unit of State or local government, any person who owned,
operated or otherwise controlled activities at such facility ... immediately beforehand.
3. "Facility" defined at 42 U.S.C. §9601(9) as:
(B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed,
or otherwise come to be located....
4. "Response" defined at 42 U.S.C. §9601 (25) as: "remove, removal, remedy, and remedial
actions, all such terms (including the terms 'removal' and 'remedial action') include enforcement
activities related thereto."
5. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(l)-(4).
6. U.S General Accounting Office, Hazardous Waste, Environmental Safegaurds Jeopardized
When Facilities Cease Operating 18 (1986).
7. A "stay" is a suspension of all actions which have been brought or could have been brought
against the debtor before the petition for bankruptcy. II U.S.C. §362(a) (1988). See infra note 19.
A stay "ensure[s] that the assets of a debtor are not reduced or disturbed and [protects] the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction over the debtor and his property." United States v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
804 F.2d 348, 350 (6th Cir. 1986).
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In order to avoid this potential escape from enforcement of environmental laws, Congress included in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19788
an exception to the automatic stay provision when a governmental unit
institutes an action within the scope of its police or regulatory powers.9
This note will discuss a recent Third Circuit Court of Appeals case, United
States v. Nicolet,'° which adjudicated the issue of a bankruptcy stay in
light of an action by the federal government to recover costs expended
in response to hazardous waste releases.
FACTS
In 1962, Nicolet, Inc. (Nicolet) purchased a tract of property in Ambler,
Pennsylvania, from a subsidiary of Turner & Newall, PLC (T & N), a
British corporation. Two large asbestos-laden waste piles existed on the
property when Nicolet purchased the tract. Unable to reach an agreement
to clean up the waste with Nicolet, the EPA entered the property and
began to remediate the waste piles itself in March 1984. The EPA has
spent $1 million in removal and remediation costs to clean up the hazardous waste at the site and estimates an additional $300,000 will be
required to finish the site remediation."
On May 30, 1985, the United States filed suit against Nicolet pursuant
to section 107(a) of CERCLA"2 in the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. The United States sought recovery of both past
and future costs incurred by the EPA during response to the hazardous
waste at the site. Nicolet joined T & N as a third party defendant alleging
T & N was liable for response costs sought in the CERCLA action or,
alternatively, for contribution or indemnity. The United States eventually
amended the complaint and named T & N as an original defendant in the
CERCLA action. T & N was joined as a past owner or operator through
the actions of a subsidiary who owned and operated the site until 1962.
Two days after the government amended its complaint to add T & N
as a defendant, Nicolet filed a voluntary petition for reorganization under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code"3 in the Bankruptcy Court for the
8. Pub. L. No. 95-598,92 Stat. 2549 (codified at II U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1988)).
9. II U.S.C. §§362(b)(4)-(5); see infra note 22.
10. 857 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1988).
11. Id. at 203. The court refused to make a distinction between past and future expenses and
decided the case "on the premise that only expenses for past activities are at issue." Id. at 207.
12. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(i)-(4) (1982 & Supp. V 1987), creates an action for recovery
of costs expended by the EPA in response to the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance
into the environment.
13. Under a Chapter II bankruptcy the court reorganizes the property of the debtor so that creditors
are treated equally and the debtor remains in business. I I U.S.C. §§ 1101-1129 (1988). If the debtor
cannot operate under the reorganization, the debtor may file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy under which
the assets are completely liquidated and distributed to the creditors. I I U.S.C. §§ 701-728 (1988).
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Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The district court trying the CERCLA
action took judicial notice of the bankruptcy provision and placed the
suit in civil suspense on September 1, 1987, pursuant to the automatic
stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code. 4 The district court did not sever
T & N before placing the suit in civil suspense. The United States moved
the court to reconsider the suspense order, arguing that the action was
not properly stayed because the CERCLA suit was an exercise of governmental police and regulatory, power within the meaning of the exception to the stay provision. "
After considering the arguments, the district court vacated the order
of civil suspense ruling that the CERCLA suit was indeed an action by
a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power. 6 The case was transferred to the trial calender for adjudication. Nicolet and T & N appealed the removal of the stay to the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals.
On appeal, Nicolet contended that the CERCLA suit was an attempt
to collect money damages and therefore not an exertion of regulatory or
police power by the government. Nicolet argued that the purpose behind
the exception is to allow equitable or injunctive proceedings to continue
in order to abate an ongoing hazard. Nicolet further asserted that an
injunctive purpose is absent in a suit such as this when the hazard is
abated and only the liability for clean-up costs is at issue. T & N argued
that Nicolet was an indispensible party and therefore if the stay should
be reinstated, proceedings against T & N should also be suspended.
The Court of Appeals, after a lengthy discussion of jurisdiction, 7 ruled
that the action by the United States was indeed an exercise of its regulatory
authority and ordered the suit to proceed to trial. The court did not reach
T & N's arguments on appeal.'"
BACKGROUND
The Bankruptcy Code
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code provides protection for the insolvent party by imposing an automatic stay on the
commencement or continuation of proceedings which could have been
14. United States v. Nicolet, Inc., No, 85-3060 (E.D. Pa. filed Sept. 1, 1987).
15. See infra note 22.
16. United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 81 Bankr. 310 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
17. Usually the stay of a civil proceeding is interlocutory (not final) and therefore not subject to
appellate review. Nicolet, 857 F.2d at 203. However, the Nicolet court ruled that when a bankruptcy
stay is at issue, the usual rules of jurisdiction will be relaxed and the non-final issue of a stay will
be heard. Id. at 207. See, Federal Interlocutory Appeals Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982 & Supp.
V 1987).
18. Nicolet, 857 F.2d at 210.
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brought or were brought against the debtor before insolvency. 9 The stay
applies to almost all types of actions or proceedings that may be brought
against the debtor.2' The stay is intended to provide the debtor with a

"breathing spell" so that it may properly reorganize its assets according
to the Bankruptcy Code. A stay is also intended to protect the creditors'
interests by forcing an orderly disposition of the debts, rather than an

"unfair race to the courthouse." 2

The governmental regulatory and police power exceptions to the automatic stay are found in sections 362(b)(4)-(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.22
However, no proceeding intended to enforce a money judgment is exempt
from the stay provisions.23 Therefore, before ordering the stay of a governmental action, a court must determine whether the actions are in fact
an attempt to enforce a money judgment; and if not, whether the government's actions fall within the regulatory or police power. 4 The vast
majority of litigation in this area has concerned the collision of state
19. I I U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988). The relevant subsections of § 362(a) provide:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a [bankruptcy] petition ...
operates as a stay, applicable to all entities of(I) the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial, administrative, or other
proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the
commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor
that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against the property of the estate, of a
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title.
20. R. Aaron, Bankruptcy Fundamentals, §501 (1984).
21. Nicolet, 857 F.2d at 207; see S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 54-55, reprinted in
1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 5840-41 [hereinafter S. Rep. No. 989]; H.R. Rep.
No. 595, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5963,
6296-97 [hereinafter H.R. Rep. No. 595].
22. 1I U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)-(5) (1988). The relevant subsections of § 362(b) provide:
The filing of a [bankruptcy] petition . . . does not operate as a stay-...
(4) under subsection (a)(l) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of
an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's
police or regulatory power;
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judgment, other
than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental unit
to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power.
For a general discussion of police and regulatory actions not stayed by the automatic stay provision,
see, Johnson & O'Leary, Automatic Stay Provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 13 N.M.L. Rev.
599, 609-10 (1983).
23. II U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) specifically exempts the enforcement of "money judgment[sJ" from
the automatic stay exception. The enforcement of a money judgment is stayed in order to prevent
the government from gaining preferential access to the debtors assets to the detriment of all other
creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding. See S. Rep. No. 989, supra note 21, at 5838; H.R. Rep.
No. 595, supra note 21, at 6299. Thus, once damages are fixed by the trial court against Nicolet,
the government would have to pursue collection of these damages in bankruptcy court, as a judgment
creditor, along with all other creditors.
24. See Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 1984).
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environmental laws and the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore federal courts,
including the Nicolet court, necessarily look to these cases for guidance.
Money Judgment versus Regulatory Enforcement
The Bankruptcy Code provides no definition of enforcement of a "money
judgment" as used in subsection 362(b)(5). Generally a money judgment
is a "final order, decree or judgment of a court by which a defendant is
required to pay a sum of money in contrast to a decree or judgment of
equity in which the court orders some other type of relief."'
In Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Environmental Resources26 the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that an action by the state of Pennsylvania to compel a debtor corporation to comply with an agreement to
clean up hazardous wastes was exempt from the automatic stay provision
of the Bankruptcy Code.7 Given that Congress did not provide a definition
of "money judgment" in the Bankruptcy Act, the court in Penn Terra
used the "commonly accepted usage" test 28 to determine the definition.
The court found that a money judgment consists of two elements: "1) an
identification of the parties for and against whom the judgment is entered;
and 2) a definite and certain designation of the amount which plaintiff is
owed by defendant." 29 Provisions for the enforcement of a money judgment are not a necessary element.
The court pointed out that the "mere entry" of a money judgment is
not affected by a bankruptcy stay as long as the "proceedings are related
to that governments regulatory or police powers. 30 But the court did not
end its analysis here. The court further reasoned that in order to avoid
"artful pleading [by the government] that depends on form rather than
substance" the court must determine whether the actual intent of the suit
is to obliquely achieve "what a money judgment was traditionally intended to accomplish and no more." 3" That is, if the government is really
protecting its pecuniary interest rather than asserting its police or regulatory power, a money judgment is, in effect, the relief sought. Therefore,
the exception to the automatic bankruptcy stay would not apply.
25. Black's Law Dictionary 907 (5th ed. 1979).
26. 733 F.2d 267.
27. The bankruptcy court inInre Penn Terra, Ltd., 24 Bankr 427,433 (W.D.Pa. 1982), reasoning
that
a money judgment was any judgment, including an injunction, requiring the immediate or future
expenditure of money, ruled that
the suit
was seeking a monetary judgment and therefore exempt.
28. 733 F.2d at275. The commonly accepted usage test "look[s] to legal custom and practice
to determine what was traditionally understood to be recovery for money damages." Id. (emphasis
inoriginal).
29. Id. (emphasis in original).
30. Id.
31. Id. at275-76.
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The Penn Terra court also noted that whether a remedy would com-

pensate for past harms resulting in injuries already suffered, or alternatively, compensate to protect against future harms, is an important factor

in determining whether a "money judgment" is actually being sought.32
The court finally held that the suit by the government would not lead to
the state receiving any money, and therefore no oblique attempt at a
money judgment existed. Rather, the money would be spent to pay private
contractors to clean up the waste site. 3 The court further held that because

the amount of money necessary for the clean-up was not determined, the
action could not be an enforcement of a money judgment.34 The Nicolet
court found the precedent of Penn Terra compelling although the facts
are distinguishable. Penn Terra dealt with an order to clean up an existing
hazard. In contrast, Nicolet dealt with the assessment of liability for a
hazard already substantially eliminated.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the Penn Terra rationale
in In re Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. 35 In Commonwealth Oil the court
concluded that an action to enforce compliance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) was not stayed by bankruptcy reorganization because the action was not an attempt to enforce a
money judgment, "notwithstanding the36fact that [the debtor] will be forced
to expend funds in order to comply. ,
In contrast, the Supreme Court held in Ohio v. Kovacs3 7 that a state
court injunction requiring the payment of money to clean up a polluted

site was a debt under provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.3" Kovacs was

the CEO of a company which operated a hazardous waste disposal site.
The State of Ohio sued Kovacs and the company for violation of state
32. Id. at 277. If the ultimate goal is the recoupment of the past damages, rather than true
injunctive relief to abate future conduct or harm, the action may loose the necessary color of a
regulatory or police power action.

33. Id. at 275. Nicolet is distinguishable in that any judgment would assess damages payable to
the government, not a private contractor.
34. Id. Cf., United States v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 13 Envt'l L. Rep. 20310 (D. N.H.
1982) (EPA order requiring debtor to remove asbestos from property was "expenditure of substantial
sums" and therefore ultimately the enforcement of a money judgment captured by the stay provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code).
35. 805 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
36. Id. at 1184. The Commonwealth Oil court also concluded that "[tihe language of these
exceptions is unambiguous--it does not limit the exercise of police or regulatory power to instances
where there can be shown imminent and identifiable harm or urgent public necessity." Id. See also,
Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1986) ("It
is clear from the legislative history that one of the purposes of this exception is to protect public
health and safety.")
37. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
38. Kovacs was a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. The Bankruptcy Code section concerning automatic
stays under Chapter 7 is comparable in effect to I I U.S.C. § 362(a), (b)(1988). See, Bankruptcy
Act of 1978, It U.S.C. §§ 101'(4), 523(a) (1988).
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environmental laws. Kovacs consented to a judgment to clean up the site.
Kovacs did not clean up the site and the State of Ohio took possession
of the property and began to remediate the hazardous conditions. However, before the site could be remediated, Kovacs filed for personal bankruptcy. The State of Ohio sued, seeking a declaration that the obligation
to clean up the site (now the State only sought money, not performance)
was not a debt or a "liability on a claim" dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code. 9 The Supreme Court ruled that the debt was a money
damage and therefore dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code.
The Supreme Court distinguished Penn Terra on the grounds that Penn
Terra was an attempt to enforce the police powers of the state, while
Kovacs was a clean-up order reduced to a money judgment." That is,
Kovacs was the true enforcement of a money judgment. The Supreme
Court noted that in Penn Terra the State had not seized any property.
Therefore the state had not approached the actual enforcement of a judgment. The Kovacs Court further stated that the automatic stay provision
does not apply to the enforcement of regulatory statutes, but the enforcement of a money judgment "by seeking money from the bankrupt...
is another matter."4 ' Thus, because Kovacs had been dispossessed of his
property, the only way he could satisfy the judgment was through the
payment of money.
The Kovacs decision obscures the issue by implying that the remediation of a current hazard cannot be forced if the state takes possession of
the property.42 However, the application of Kovacs to a case such as
Nicolet is dubious. In Kovacs, the Supreme Court was determining whether
a debt was dischargeable, not whether liability could be fixed. Kovacs
raises the point that even when the government is successful in a CERCLA
suit to establish liability, the judgment for damages is ultimately subject
to the bankruptcy court proceedings. Nicolet argued that under Kovacs,
because a CERCLA suit will ultimately lead to liability in bankruptcy
court, such a suit is an attempt to collect damages and therefore is subject
to an automatic stay.
The Supreme Court further obscured the issue of bankruptcy stays in
39. See II U.S.C. § 101(4) (1988).
40. 469 U.S. at 283 n. 11.
41. Id. Nicolet unsuccessfully attempted to use Kovacs to prove that the action was one to enforce
a money judgment. Brief of Appellant Nicolet at 14-15, United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d
202 (3d Cir. 1988) (No. 88-1079 & 88-1110).
42. The Nicolet court chose not to discuss the Kovacs decision. Perhaps this was necessary to
set a clear, strong precedent. Alternatively, Nicolet is distinguishable in that the government is only
seeking to establish liability, rather than enforce a money judgment, and these are clearly two different
proceedings, as the Nicolet court recognized. The main criticism of Kovacs is that it failed to
adequately decide whether a clean-up order is the equivalent of a money judgment. Thome, Automatic
Stay; Section 362, 3 Bankr. Dev. J. 181, 194 (1986).
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Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Environmental Protection. 3 In Midlantic, the Quanta Resources Corporation was sued to clean
up waste oil treatment facilities in New York and New Jersey. Quanta
tried to clean up the site under a Chapter 11 bankruptcy but was financially
unable to perform the reclamation. Quanta subsequently filed for a Chapter 7 liquidation. Midlantic National Bank, trustee of Quanta's estate,
sought to abandon the property under section 554 of the Bankruptcy
Code.' If Midlantic could abandon the site, it would not have to clean
it up. The Supreme Court noted that the abandonment section of the
Bankruptcy Code was qualified by the state's power to protect the public's
health and safety.45 This ruling was in direct opposition to a statement
(albeit dictum) in Kovacs that implied a trustee could legally abandon a
polluted property back to the prior owner, who would then have to comply
with the state environmental law "to the extent of his or its ability."'
The Court in Midlantic did not explain this earlier statement in Kovacs.
Thus, in Midlantic, the Court refused to allow the trustee to abandon the
property and the expense of clean-up. The trustee is therefore forced to
comply with the state environmental laws to the detriment of the estate
and the other creditors. Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, argued that such a
ruling would, in effect, put the state's interest in protecting the public
"fisc" or treasury ahead of the interests of the other creditors of the
estate. 47
The Nicolet court took note that the government made no attempt to
seize property in order to satisfy the judgment. Thus, the court reasoned
that the suit at issue was only an attempt to fix liability, an action properly
excepted from the automatic stay. The court further reasoned that the
government was not seeking compensation for private wrongs, but rather
exercising its "explicit mandate" 4 under CERCLA to redress environmental wrongs. Citing deterrence as one reason for this broad mandate,
the court concluded the government was not pursuing any pecuniary
interest. 9
43. 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
44. I1 U.S.C. §554(a) (1988) states that: "'after notice and hearing, the trustee may abandon
any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and
benefit to the estate." Thus, if Midlantic could abandon the property, it could in effect relieve itself
of the liability of cleaning up the property.
45. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Court found support for this
interpretation in the automatic stay exceptions of II U.S.C. §362(a) (1988). Justice Rehnquist
disagreed, reasoning that if Congress had wanted such an exception to apply to abandonment,
Congress would have explicitly enacted the exception. Id. at 513. See also, United States v. Price,
688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir, 1982) (holding that an injunction which may force payment of money is not
necessarily a money judgment if the state was seeking to prevent future harm).
46. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 284 n. 12.
47. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 516 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
48. Nicolet. 857 F2d at 209.
49. Id. at 210.
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Police or Regulatory Power versus Pecuniary Interest of the
Government
Once the issue of whether the action is designed to enforce a money
judgment is settled, a court must determine whether the government is
bringing suit under the color of its regulatory or police powers in accordance with subsections 362(b)(4)-(5) of the Bankruptcy Code. To be
exempt, the power exerted by the government must be related to the

health and safety of the public and not the pecuniary interest of the
government.-' Defendants often assert that the government is in fact
protecting its pecuniary interests rather than protecting the health, safety,
and welfare of the public."
However, environmental reclamation is of such great importance that

generally environmental enforcement procedures are bluntly labeled as
regulatory or police power actions." Indeed, the explicit congressional
intent found in the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code to exempt
enforcement of environmental laws seems dispositive of this issue. The
Supreme Court noted this congressional intent in Midlantic:
Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the expanded
automatic stay to foreclose States' efforts to enforce their antipollution
laws, and Congress wanted to overrule these interpretations in its
1978 revision."
Under CERCLA the government may take many measures to protect
the public from dangers associated with hazardous wastes. The government may: seek injunctive relief, seek fines or penalties,54 or clean up
itself and seek recovery of costs from responsible parties." Cost recovery
50. See, Missouri v. United States Bankruptcy Court, 647 F.2d 768, 776 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982) (if impetus is pecuniary interest, action stayed); Illinois v. Electric
Utilities, Inc., 41 Bankr. 874 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("[362(b)(4)] insulates states from automatic stay
provision when they attempt to protect their citizens from environmental hazards.") See, 124 Cong.
Rec. HI 1089, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 655545, remarks of Rep.
Edwards:
(section 362(b)(4)] is intended to be given a narrow construction in order to permit
governmental units to pursue actions to protect the public health and safety and not
to apply to actions by a governmental unit to protect a pecuniary interest in property
of the debtor.
Cf., Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Evans Plumbing Co., 639 F2d 291 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that
government suit can be an enforcement proceeding without deciding whether the primary purpose
is the government's pecuniary interest).
51. See, e.g., Penn Terra, 733 F.2d 267 (1984).
52. "No more obvious exercise of a State's power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of
the public can be imagined." Id. at 274. See also, Brock v. Morysville Body Works, Inc., 829 F.2d
383, 388 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Mattiace Indus. Inc., 73 Bankr. 816, 819 (E.D. N.Y.
1987); United States v. Standard Metals Corp., 49 Bankr. 623 (D. Colo. 1985); United States v.
ILCO, Inc., 48 Bankr. 1016 (N.D. Ala. 1985); United States v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.,
818 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1987).
53. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 504 (1986).
54. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§9606(a)-(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
55. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §9607(a) (Supp. V 1987).
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actions are an integral part of the enforcement scheme of CERCLA. In
fact, CERCLA could not operate if costs were not recovered. One of the
primary goals of CERCLA and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 198656 (SARA) is to sustain the Superfund."' Therefore,
an action taken with the intention of carrying out such a goal consistent
with CERCLA must necessarily be a police or regulatory power.
The court in United States v. Mattiace Industries, Inc.," was faced
with a CERCLA suit to recover funds expended in the clean-up of a
hazardous waste site. The Mattiace court concluded that CERCLA was
"clearly enacted to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public." 59
The court reasoned that the deterrence effect of strict CERCLA enforcement necessarily makes the statute regulatory.' This has been the unanimous conclusion of all courts considering whether a CERCLA suit is
61
truly in the interests of the government's pocket or the public's safety.
The Nicolet court followed the general precedent and ruled that a CERCLA cost-recovery action was not pecuniary in nature.
ANALYSIS

The Court's Reasoning
The court acknowledged Nicolet's arguments (that the stay exceptions
apply only when the state seeks purely injunctive relief to prevent future
harm) were "rational and not all that inconsistent with the [statute." '62
However, the court was compelled by the legislative history and the broad
mandate of CERCLA to rule that a suit for determination of liability in
a CERCLA 107(a) action was a regulatory action within the meaning of
the stay exception.
The court first looked to the Bankruptcy Act's legislative history to
determine whether the suit was a regulatory or police power action. The
court found language in the legislative history that explicitly named environmental statute actions as excepted from the stay:
where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to stop violation of a
fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or sim56. 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9675 (Supp. V 1987).
57. Comment, Federal Common Law of Contribution Under the 1986 CERCLA Amendments, 14

Ecology L.Q. 365, 379-80 (1987).
58. 73 Bankr. 816 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
59. Id. at 819. The court went further in this generalization in stating that a CERCLA suit,
"whether for injunctive relief or for recovery of costs, damages, and penalties" are brought to protect
the public health, safety, and welfare. Id.
60. See e.g., United States v. Standard Metals Corp., 49 Bankr. 623, 625 (D. Colo. 1985)
(deterrence effect of strict enforcement of Clean Water Act makes government actions for fines
regulatory in nature and therefore exempt from the automatic stay).
61. See, United States v. ILCO. Inc., 48 Bankr. 1016, 1024 (N.D. Ala. 1985); United States v.
Mackay, No. 85-H-823-S (N.D. Ala. 1985).
62. Nicolet, 857 F.2d at 208.
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ilar police or regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed under
the automatic stay.6'

This express intent would at first glance seem to settle the issue. However, the court realized that despite the blunt language in the legislative
history, the action must still be an action "related to the government's
police or regulatory power"' in order to meet the statutory test. Thus,
the court turned to its decision in Penn Terra to find support that "efforts
to rectify harmful environmental sites are obvious exercises of the state's
police power to protect the health, safety and welfare of the public."'65
The Nicolet court also addressed Nicolet's assertion that the action was
in fact an enforcement of a money judgment as prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code. The court again went to Penn Terra, noting that in that case
the court determined that the "paradigm" or pattern for such a proceeding
is an attempt to seize the debtor's property.' In Nicolet, the action included no attempt to seize the debtor's property in order to enforce a

judgment. In fact, in the Nicolet case, liability has not even been established; the CERCLA litigation in the district court will establish liability.
The court also cited cases in other areas of law that allowed a governmental agency to pursue an action in light of bankruptcy up to the
point of enforcement of a judgment for damages.67 The court in National
Labor Relations Board v. Edward Cooper Painting" applied a pecuniary
interest/public policy interest balancing test to determine whether exemption from the automatic stay was proper. The test balances the gov63. Id., (emphasis in original), citing, S. Rep. No. 989, supra note 21 at 5838; H.R. Rep. No.
595, supra note 21 at 6299. See also, S. Rep. 989, supra note 21 at 5838, H.R. Rep. 595, supra
note 21 at 6299: "paragraph (5) [of subsection 362(b)] makes clear that the exception extends to
permit an injunction to enforce a money judgment, but does not extend to permit enforcement of a
money judgment." See also, Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 272 (3d
Cir. 1984).
64. Nicolet, 857 F.2d at 208; see Penn Terra, 733 F.2d 267 at 275.
65. Nicolet, 857 F.2d at 208; Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 274 ("No more obvious exercise of the
State's power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public can be imagined." See also,
United States v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 818 F.2d 1077, 1086-87 (3d Cir. 1987) (ruling
that severe financial straits and bankruptcy do not operate as a stay to enforcement of a consent
decree under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
66. Nicolet. 857 F.2d at 209; Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 275; see also, Black's Law Dictionary 510
(5th ed. 1979) ("Execution upon a money judgment is the legal process of enforcing the judgment,
usually by seizing and selling the property of the debtor").
67. EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F2d 318 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 910 (1986)
(EEOC not precluded from bringing suit for backpay damages under Title VII); Nat'l Labor Relations
Bd. v. Edward Cooper Painting, Inc., 804 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1986) (NLRB not prohibited from
issuing Order for backpay damaged because of bankruptcy); United States v. Mattiace Indus., Inc.,
73 Bankr. 816 (E.D. N.Y. 1987); United States v. Standard Metals Corp., 49 Bankr. 623 (D. Colo.
1985) (suit seeking damages for violation of settlement agreement under the Clean Water Act of
1977, 33 U.S.C. 1251-1387 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), within police power exception to automatic
stay provision).
68. 804 F.2d 934.
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ernment's actual pecuniary interest in the debtor's property against the
government's obligation and interest in protecting the public's safety and
welfare. When the government, is pursuing the action primarily because
of its pecuniary interest, the action cannot be properly stayed.69
The Nicolet court determined that the government action was regulatory
in nature because the CERCLA mandate that the EPA take the "appropriate environmental response action to protect public health and the
environment from the dangers posed by [hazardous] sites" '7 outweighed
any financial interest. According to Nicolet, because CERCLA further

states that response cost liability is mandated in the quest to abate hazards
and deter future pollution, 7 a suit for response costs up to and including
the entry of a monetary judgment must be a regulatory action within the

meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. 2

The government admitted it was precluded from seeking an enforce-

ment of any money judgment it obtained in the CERCLA action.73 How-

ever, the district court may now assess damages against Nicolet and
T & N. If both are found partially liable, the government may sue T & N

for the entire judgment. 74

Analysis of the Court's Reasoning
The Nicolet court reached a necessary and logical conclusion. If the
69. Id. at 942. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
70. H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News, 6119, 6119-20, as cited in Nicolet, 857 F.2d at 209. in fact, Nicolet seems to be
the perfect example that the government often has both pecuniary interests and interests in the health
and welfare of the public. That is, the government must protect the economic viability of the Superfund
in order to protect the health and welfare of society. Thus, although the government has both pecuniary
and health and welfare interests, the health and welfare interests appear to be primary and paramount.
71. 42 U.S.C. §9607(a) (Supp. V 1987).
72. Nicolet, 857 F.2d at 210. Enforcement of a money judgment is specifically precluded from
the exception to the automatic stay provision in II U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1988) of the Bankruptcy
Act. See supra note 22.
73. Nicolet, 857 F.2d at 207.
74. Ultimately the government is probably seeking a money judgment from T & N. Although
the government could have sued T & N alone for liability, to recover the entire expense quickly
(and avoid the problem that T & N may only be partially !iable) a suit against Nicolet was prudent.
CERCLA imposes a scheme of joint and several liability whereby any party found partly liable is
liable for the whole judgment. United States v. Bliss, 667 F.Supp. 1298, 313-14 (E.D. Mo. 1987);
United States v. Wade, 577 F.Supp. 1326, 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1983); United States v. Chem-Dyne
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808-810 (S.D. Ohio 1983). Congress expressly endorsed joint and several
liability in SARA, 42 U.S.C. §9613(f) (Supp. V 1987). See H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 59, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2835, 2841. The liable parties can
then seek contribution from each other in a separate suit after the government has been reimbursed.
If T & N were held liable to the government for the entire cost of clean-up, it would be virtually
impossible for T & N to recover contribution from Nicolet given Nicolet's bankruptcy.The goverment's plan apparently worked; in the end, Nicolet settled with the government and T & N, unable
to settle, was left holding the bag in the § 107 action. United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp.
1193, 1195-96 (E.D.Pa. 1989).
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court had found that a stay was appropriate, an unacceptable burden would
be placed on the Superfund and an already struggling CERCLA would
be all the more crippled. By ignoring the conflicting case law and analyses,
the court went straight to the ultimate issues: congressional intent, environmental reclamation, and owner culpability.
An exception to the stay is necessary for many other reasons. For
instance, if the EPA did not have confidence it could pursue costs in
court, the EPA may become reticent to spend scarce Superfund monies
in many cases. Alternatively, if bankruptcy stays are allowed, the EPA
may be forced to seek cooperation with reticent polluters more aggressively, thus undermining negotiation, creating more litigation, and slowing the reclamation process. This would leave potentially harmful sites
unreclaimed for longer periods of time.
However, the court may have weakened the precedential authority of
Nicolet by ignoring some of the more difficult issues in a case such as
this.The first issue not adequately addressed by the court is the nonregulatory nature of CERCLA. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was
passed before CERCLA existed. In 1978, environmental protection laws
were almost purely injunctive in nature. Aside from occasional penalties,
these environmental laws exclusively control future behavior. 5 The stay
exception was drafted with this type of environmental statute in mind.
CERCLA is a different type of animal. CERCLA, rather than forming
future behavior in order to protect the environment, addresses past behavior to remedy existing hazardous situations."6 Admittedly, CERCLA
does control future behavior through deterrence, but this effect is indirect.
Most pollution to which CERCLA is applicable already exists. CERCLA
is primarily designed to address past actions, and the Superfund must be
sustained with monies from responsible parties to address existing pollution, rather than future pollution.
In many ways CERCLA is more like a criminal liability statute rather
than a traditional civil liability environmental statute. It is doubtful that
Congress could foresee an environmental statute like CERCLA when it
passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978." Therefore, the court should
carefully address Congress' intent when applying the Bankruptcy Reform
Act to CERCLA. Was Congress intending to apply the automatic stay
exception under all circumstances to statutes which set financial responsibility? The legislative history supports this conclusion. However, the
75. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1982 &
Supp. V 1987); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§6901-6991 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
76. However, CERCLA does seek to control future behavior through deterrence.
77. CERCLA was rushed through Congress at the end of a lame duck session with little debate.
United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemical Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 n. 8 (8th Cir. 1989).
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effect of an exception to the automatic stay on other creditors and the
structured bankruptcy process cannot be ignored.
As already noted, one of the necessary objectives of CERCLA is to
sustain the Superfund with monies from polluters. However, this need
does not necessarily outweigh all other interests in every case. Interested
parties not mentioned in Nicolet are the third-party creditors of Nicolet.
There has been some movement in Congress to make debts to the government the highest priority in bankruptcy actions.7" If this comes to bear,
hazardous waste site owners will have difficulty securing loans and equipment to operate and the already difficult industry of hazardous waste
disposal will be further burdened. Therefore, the courts must look honestly
at the interests of the government and the interests of the free market.
Ultimately, the balance must be decided by Congress. However, courts
in the meantime should not ignore the counterbalancing interests in cases
such as this. 79
When the hazard is already abated, as in Nicolet, the ultimate issue is

money; whether that money is needed to further protect citizens' health
and safety is another question. The government's true pecuniary interest
should not automatically outweigh all other interests. The goal of the

Bankruptcy Code exceptions to the automatic stay is not enforcement of
environmental laws at all costs. Rather the Code recognizes that all creditors must have an equal chance to reclaim their investments. Until Congress explicitly decides the balance between the interests of the government
and the interests of the free market, the policies in the Bankruptcy Code
should not be ignored. Congress must explicitly act in the bankruptcy/
78. E.g., H.R. 2767, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983) provided:
Any claim of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision for the costs of
removal or remedial action taken under [section 104 or 107 for which a debtor is
liable] . . . shall have priority over all other classes of claims against such debtor,
without regard to whether such claims are secured.
The EPA may attempt in the future to assert in bankruptcy court that clean-up damages have a first
priority because they are "administrative expenses" which are necessary to preserve the estate.
Bankruptcy Code, Il U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(l)(A), 507(a)(1)(1988). That is, they are necessary to preserve the estate because of the duty of the polluter (debtor) to clean up the hazardous waste. Note,
Belly Up Down in the Dumps: Bankruptcyand Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 1037,
1059, 1059-61 (1985) (authored by Katherine Simpson Allen). See generally. K.R. Heidt, Cleaning
Up Your Act: Efficiency Considerations in the Battle for the Debtor's Assets in Toxic Waste Bankruptcies, 40 Rutgers L. Rev. 819 (1988).
79. See, e.g.. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 921 (3d Cir. 1984) (the court must
"balance the relative weight of the state (environmental] and federal (bankruptcy] policies."); See
also, Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985). Although the Kovacs case is questionable precedent,
the Nicolet court may have been mistaken not to acknowledge that in some circumstances the interests
of the debtor outweigh the ultimate pecuniary interests of the government. On the other hand, it is
arguable that the interests served by environmental laws always outweigh the interests served by the
Bankruptcy Act. See, In re Quanta, 739 F.2d at 921.
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CERCLA arena to prevent courts from relying on fickle legislative history
to solve these disputes in the future.' 0
CONCLUSIONS
The court in Nicolet reached a reasonable and necessary conclusion
when it granted an exception to the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Act. Environmental reclamation is such a strong social policy that
it would seem absurd to allow a polluter to escape liability with bankruptcy. A suit such as Nicolet must be considered, as it properly was by
the Nicolet court, in two contexts. First, public health and safety must
be considered when analyzing a bankruptcy stay in an environmental
proceeding. Second, the purely legal issue of whether a CERCLA section
107 suit is a suit seeking a money judgment must be determined. The
potentially competing interests of environmental laws and the Bankruptcy
Code must be considered. In future litigation, not all decisions will favor
both of these contexts. Explicit action by Congress is necessary to balance
these potentially competing interests. Only then will costly and time
consuming litigation such as Nicolet be stopped.
DOUGLAS L. HAYES

80. Legislative history is arguably a dangerous device on which to hinge a ruling because "it
must be assumed that what the Members of the House and Senators thought they were voting for,
and what the President thought he was approving when he signed the bill, was what the text plainly
said, rather than what a few representatives, or even a committee report, said it said." United States
v. Taylor, U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2413 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). See, Artesian Water Co.
v. Government of New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3rd Cir. 1989), in which the Third Circuit
stated that legislative history, because of the complex enactment process, "furnishes at best a sparse
and unreliable guide to the statute's meaning." Id. (discussing CERCLA).

